

Greece in the Holy Land during the British Mandate: Diplomacy and Religion

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The Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem is the oldest Christian institution in Palestine. It is autocephalous¹ and administratively structured as a monastic fraternity, the Brotherhood of the Holy Sepulchre, according to which the patriarch exercises absolute power over all of its affairs. The protection of the extensive Orthodox rights over the holy places, as defined by the so-called Status Quo agreement, is considered to be the primary duty of the institution.² From the incorporation of Palestine into the Ottoman Empire (1516), the brotherhood was gradually subjected to the control of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, the synod of which, in some instances, even appointed the Jerusalem patriarch.³ Overall, the hierarchical relationship between the two institutional agents, in conjunction with the Greek nation-building process, allowed the gradual Hellenization of the Jerusalem patriarchate. This development, however, meant that the indigenous clergy and laity were actually excluded from participating in the church's governance. The Arab Orthodox population often reacted dynamically against this state of affairs, demanding the recognition of its rights over what it perceived to be its national cultural patrimony.

The opening of the Mandate period in Palestine raised the hope of the indigenous Eastern Orthodox community for the Arabization of the Orthodox patriarchate of Jerusalem, within which the Greek element was dominant. The fulfillment of this demand became part of Palestinian nationalist ideology and was reflected in the overall involvement of the lay Orthodox in the Muslim-Christian Associations, as well as in the First Arab Orthodox Congress in Haifa (July 1923). To counteract this development, the Greek religious

establishment forged political alliances at a local level to protect its power over the church institution. At the same time, Greece, as the patriarchate's national center, attempted to intervene both at the domestic and diplomatic level to secure its own ends.

The present article elaborates on Athens's activities in this regard during the Mandate period. Within this framework, the role of Greek diplomacy in the affairs of the patriarchate was crucial, influencing the decision-making process of the religious establishment and intervening on its behalf in the international power centers with a twofold aim: the maintenance of the Status Quo; and the preservation of the Greek character of the patriarchate. More specifically, this article aims to explore critically: a) the form of, and the factors fuelling, the alliance between Greece and the patriarchate; b) the events that marked their dynamic relationship; and c) their practical outcomes at both intra-ecclesial and political levels. In addition to published records and secondary literature, the archival sources used for this analysis mainly derive from the Greek ministry of foreign affairs and the British national archives. Special mention should also be made of Sotirios Roussos's unpublished Ph.D. thesis on Greece's Middle Eastern foreign policy in the interwar years.⁴ This article is divided into three parts. The first provides a description of British policy in relation to the national and religious communities in Mandate Palestine, making reference to the social and political stakes of local and foreign players involved in general, and the Orthodox patriarchate and Athens government in particular. The second part examines the terms in which the Jerusalem hierarchy and Athens government portrayed their relations, focusing on the ideological features and political connotations of their discourse. Greek diplomacy's attempts to influence patriarchal affairs, and its impact on domestic communal politics, is also elaborated upon here. The paper concludes with an overall assessment of the Greek strategy and its articulation within the British colonial project.

Religious Politics in Mandate Palestine

For a better understanding of the context within which the British administration set out its policy priorities, it is necessary to sketch out the framework within which the Christian communities of Palestine operated in late Ottoman times. Its major features were the millet system, the Status Quo doctrine, and the capitulations regime. According to the millet system, each religious community was under the supervision of its religious head (for example, the Orthodox/Rum millet under the Jerusalem patriarch), whose rights and privileges were stipulated ad hoc by the *berat* of investiture issued by the Porte each time a new leadership was elected. As regards the Rum millet, this system did not imply a national grouping, but rather had a religious meaning indicating the Orthodox community per se.⁵ The Status Quo doctrine regulated the custodianship rights of each church over the Christian holy places, as arranged by the *firman* of 1757. This normative frame was further acknowledged by the Porte in 1852, and recognized by the international community in the Treaty of Paris (1856) and the Congress of Berlin (1878). According to the Status Quo, the Orthodox Church acquired a predominant position in comparison to other denominations, which was a cause of constant antagonism between

them.⁶ Under the capitulations regime, foreign state powers were granted the right to protect their subjects residing in the empire, as well as affiliated clergy. Accordingly, this system established France as the protector of all Roman Catholic clergy, regardless of their nationality, and Russia of the Orthodox subjects, though this status was under question.⁷ By acquiring political competencies, Western countries actually exercised state powers within a foreign state. In effect, the door was opened to intervention in the affairs of the empire on the pretext that the rights of their co-religionists were being violated. For instance, the controversy between clergy about the guardianship of the holy places became fertile ground for foreign powers to exercise pressure on the Porte to advance their various objectives (as during the Crimean War, for example).

Within this context, British policy regarding the operation of the various religious institutions in Palestine was based on three strategic aims: the Balfour Declaration; the abolition of the capitulations regime; and the maintenance of the Status Quo. However, these faced a series of obstacles. Regarding the future creation of the Jewish National Home, the British had to handle the reactions of the indigenous population that threatened the legitimization of their rule. As elsewhere in their history, the British adopted a strategy for maintaining control that exploited or invented religious or ethnic differences within the colonized society. The development and political institutionalization of such a structural form allowed the British to keep for themselves the role of the “impartial” arbiter and represent their rule “as above or outside a ‘local’ conflict, rather than as part of it, or even the creator of it.”⁸ The difference between Palestine and other colonies where the British implemented the “divide and rule” doctrine was that in the former they found the ground already prepared by the Ottomans. In short, they did not have to construct new social distinctions, but could redesign the pre-existing millet system to their ends, at the same time blocking the developing Arab Palestinian national ideology from becoming hegemonic. In other words, to justify vesting the Jewish community with sovereign rights over Palestine, the British had to represent the society not as a coherent body with a shared collective identity, which despite the differences within it would form a modern polity on the basis of the nation-state frame, but as a juxtaposition of distinct communities divided along sectarian lines.⁹ At the same time, the preservation of the civil and judicial authorities ascribed to the religious leadership by the millet system opened the way for better understanding between the British administration and the Christian churches, whose support was necessary to counteract Arab resistance.¹⁰

The capitulations question, too, was complex, since it involved the strategic interests of both France and Russia. On the one hand, the Sykes-Picot agreement stipulated that Palestine would be under international control, thus implying the continuation of French and Russian religious protectorates. On the other hand, the entrance of Italy (which disputed the French preeminence) into the Entente, as well as the withdrawal of Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution, and the fact that the “boots on the ground” were British, eventually allowed London to take direct control of the administration, at the same time removing the constraints placed on its authority by the capitulations.¹¹ Despite French insistence, the British prime minister Lloyd George, with the open support of his Italian counterpart, Francesco Nitti, made clear in the London Peace Conference (of February

1920) that the creation of an *imperium in imperio* within the boundaries of its Mandate could not be accepted.¹² It should also be noted that Paris did not actually enjoy the support of its protégé, the Vatican, which was effectively cooperating with the new sovereign of Palestine.¹³ The San Remo Conference (of April 1920) officially marked the end of the capitulations regime.¹⁴ As regards the Status Quo, regime change opened the door for the Vatican to demand a new *modus operandi* in relation to the custodianship of the holy places.¹⁵ However, all state actors involved viewed the question as a potential source of constant and non-manageable conflict. Especially for the British, it would open the wineskin of Aeolus, allowing foreign powers to interfere in the affairs of their Mandate. In effect, the maintenance of the Status Quo was considered imperative.¹⁶ To this end, the British found a loyal ally in the Greek state, both at the diplomatic level as well as in the local communal landscape, via its influence on the Orthodox patriarchate.

Greek Diplomacy and Mandatory Palestine

The strategic aim of Athens was the preservation of the Jerusalem patriarchate's Greek national character. Greece's political positioning vis-à-vis this institution can be divided into two stages during the Mandate. The first, which roughly covers the period of 1917–1920, was characterized by Athens's vigorous intervention into the affairs of the patriarchate. For Athens, regime change was seen as an opportunity to establish the national center's direct rule over the patriarchate. However, the British blocked this attempt due to domestic as well as international considerations. Despite this, Greece maintained its central importance in religious administration throughout the rest of the Mandate period, but local authorities held primacy in decision-making. Greek diplomats followed developments within the institution, and got involved in various individual cases, but did not claim the right to fully control its affairs.

The ideological frame legitimizing the allegedly primordial Greek national character of the church was based on a paradigmatic shift in the hegemonic political orientation of the religious establishment from “universalism” to Greek ethnocentrism. To this end, the Greek state's policy of promoting Helleno-Orthodoxia as the national narrative played a major role, along with the Tanzimat reforms and Russian penetration into Palestine.¹⁷ In brief, Orthodoxy was employed instrumentally as a means to construct collective loyalties and incorporate the Orthodox populations of the Ottoman Empire into the Greek national body.¹⁸ Helleno-Orthodoxia was based on the alleged historical continuity of the Greek nation and its identification with the Orthodox Church. In effect, one presupposed the other: Greek meant Orthodox and vice versa.¹⁹ The indigenous Christians, therefore, were not considered to be Arab, but rather Arabic-speaking populations (Arabophones) of Greek origin.²⁰ However, since they did not identify as Greeks, and thus rejected their nation, they had no right to interfere in patriarchal affairs; the patriarchate should in principle be in Greek hands and the other Orthodox nations were viewed as “out-groups” upon whom were conferred an inferior status within the institution.²¹

In political terms, this framework determined the subordination of the patriarchate

to direct rule by Athens. In other words, the Helleno-Orthodox doctrine presupposed that the self-fulfillment of the church rested on promoting the alleged “national good,” as defined by the national center.²² In this regard, the projection of the holy places as Greek national property had both an ethno-symbolic and a political value. First, this construction, highlighting the alleged linear continuity of the collective group to the so-called “Royal Race” (the Byzantine Empire), represented the imagined superiority of the Greek nation; since the Greeks protected the Christian holy of holies, they represented the new “chosen people.”²³ Second, in conjunction with Russian withdrawal, it opened the door for Greece to promote its diplomatic status. Implementation of this policy depended on two conditions: the Greek composition of the brotherhood; and the cooperation of the religious leadership.

Within this context, the establishment of the British Mandate was a welcome development for Athens. First, it avoided the possibility of French or Italian rule over Palestine, which would likely have led to the promotion of Latin interests in the holy places. At the same time, the cordial relations between the Orthodox Church and the Anglican Church meant that Greek religious objectives would have an ally in the decision-making center.²⁴ Besides, Athens was pleased with London’s impartial position with respect to religious affairs, as well as Lloyd George’s self-proclamation as the protector of Orthodox rights. Second, at the beginning of the Mandate, Greek officials considered the new administration an ally in controlling the religious bureaucracy. Third, the British strategy to maintain the sectarian structure of political operations was thought to secure the dominant position of Greek religious officials. It was believed that the patriarchate’s national character would be further promoted by a future Jewish state, as stipulated in the Balfour Declaration, in preference to an Arab administration that would support the laity’s demands. In this regard, the Greek minister of foreign affairs Nikolaos Politis advocated the creation of a Jewish state as early as June 1917, while Consul Georgios Tzorbatzoglou was the first foreign diplomat in Jerusalem to affirm his support to the Jewish cause.²⁵

In addition to the potential positive effects for the Greek hierarchy, Athens’s pro-Zionist policy might also be attributed to three additional factors. First, it might be interpreted as a friendly gesture toward the pro-Ottoman Jewish community of Thessaloniki, which was incorporated into the Greek state after the First Balkan War (1912).²⁶ Second, it was possibly founded on the strategic alliance with Britain. Based on the idea that “my friend’s friend is a friend,” since London endorsed the Zionist cause, Greece had to follow its political patron. Third, the Vatican’s active anti-Zionism might be thought as a “safety valve” for Greek interests in the holy places. Indeed, Politis discussed the question with Nahum Sokolow in Paris Peace Conference, where the Zionist leader stated his preference for an international commission responsible for the administration of the holy places “as against the French claim to exclusive French control.” Most importantly, he affirmed that the rights that “were vested in the Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, who is a Hellene,” should be maintained.²⁷

In this regard, it should be stressed that the Greek administration did not interfere in negotiations regarding the holy places. London took the Status Quo system for granted as

a precondition for social order. The only time Athens became active in this issue was when the question arose of creating a commission to determine the rights of each denomination over the holy places, as stipulated by article 14 of the Mandate. Facing the dangerous proposition of a commission exclusively composed of Catholic representatives, Athens appealed to London to acquire a seat in the new political organ. However, the British turned down the Greek request. The British rejected altogether a commission so composed, as an official Greek claim to participation would have encouraged the Vatican to insist on the proposed scheme. This would have undermined Athens's own interests, because potential Greek participation would not actually pose a threat to the Catholic majority, instead legitimizing its decisions. Thus, British officials asserted that Greek diplomacy had no reason to worry about patriarchal rights and should no longer get involved.²⁸ In any case, the British only viewed the commission as a temporary instrument for the adjudication of minor disputes between the interested religious parties. Any suggestion of it having administrative responsibilities was unacceptable.²⁹

On the other hand, without disputing the basic premises of Helleno-Orthodoxia at its core, two opposing groups emerged within the Jerusalem patriarchate in regard to its relationship with Athens. The first accepted Athens's primacy and was affiliated with external church officials such as Meletios, the metropolitan of Athens, against Patriarch Damianos's rule. For Meletios, a condition for patriarchal election should have been the Greek king's approval of the nomination.³⁰ The second faction believed the patriarchate should be allied with Athens, but, despite its Greek character, should not be dependent on the Greek ministry of foreign affairs. It should be autonomous and determine its own policies, while Athens's role should remain auxiliary and consultative.

Dividing lines between these two groups had already been drawn during the patriarchal crisis of 1908–1910, when there was an unsuccessful attempt to depose Patriarch Damianos. Damianos's forced retreat to Damascus, following that of the Ottoman army in 1917, provided an opportunity to again challenge his power. The general assembly of the brotherhood, with the support of Antonis Sachtouris, the Greek diplomatic agent in Alexandria, declared Damianos's see vacant. This body had no legal or canonical foundation whatsoever, and thus had no authority over patriarchal affairs. Still, under Sachtouris's guidance, the brotherhood declared in its resolution of 3 May 1918 the full transfer of control over all of its administrative and financial affairs to the Greek government.³¹ For the first time in history, the patriarchate openly declared its affiliation with Greece in political terms.³² Ideologically, it marked the loss of the patriarchate's universality as the representative of Christian Orthodoxy, the end to its ecumenical presence in the Holy Land, and its transition to a political dependency on Greece.³³ The conditions put forward by Athens for accepting the invitation were the deposition of Damianos and the election of Porphyrios, the archbishop of Sinai, as *locum tenens* (or placeholder) patriarch.³⁴ Sachtouris supported the nomination of Porphyrios, who was associated with Ronald Storrs and Gilbert Clayton and, more importantly, had affirmed his adherence to Athens's orders.³⁵ In September 1918, the brotherhood deposed Damianos and nominated Porphyrios. However, the British administration denied the Greek plans. It did not accept the institutional validity of the brotherhood's resolution, nor did it

recognize Damianos's deposition. Nevertheless, the British accepted Porphyrios as *locum tenens*, since the patriarch, due to his forced stay in Damascus, could not serve his office.³⁶ Moreover, the British consented to the delegation of two Greek financial advisors on the condition that the British administration would be fully informed about the patriarchal finances and that the Greeks would not take any action without the administration's approval.³⁷

In January 1919, however, the British decided to reinstate Damianos to his see. The pressure from the indigenous Arab Orthodox, as well as the support of both Amir Faysal and the Latin Church for Damianos, played a significant role in this decision.³⁸ For Porphyrios, the Greeks were victims of a frame-up by the British, who self-represented their authority as respecting the rights of the indigenous population.³⁹ The authorities were well informed about the Greek plans, as they controlled their correspondence.⁴⁰ Moreover, Sachtouris, Porphyrios, and others had held discussions for eleven months with British officials who pretended to support the Greek plans, albeit unofficially.⁴¹ For instance, Damianos's deposition and Porphyrios's nomination took place with their tacit approval. Athens had no option but to comply with the new state of affairs. Politis's order was to approach Damianos and reach an agreement to block the patriarch's alliance with the Arab laity.⁴² Despite the lack of coordination between the central authority and the responsible diplomatic and religious officials, the strategy was to cooperate with Damianos, while at the same time cultivating the ground for his eventual expulsion.⁴³ A growing financial problem provided such an opportunity.

At the beginning of the Mandate, the patriarchate found itself on the verge of bankruptcy, indebted for around 500,000 Egyptian pounds, which was put under moratorium.⁴⁴ In 1919, to fortify its dominance within the institution, Athens proposed a loan to cover all of the debt, providing that Damianos would be deposed, the brotherhood would enact new regulations, and ecclesiastical property would be mortgaged to the Greek state.⁴⁵ Athens's aim was, first, to secure the transition of religious power and, then, to fully control the church at an institutional and financial level. As it was plainly stated, the patriarch should never act "without the knowledge and approval of the local representative of the Greek Government, to the orders of which [Damianos] had from now on to adapt his administrative policy. The Patriarchate should become a dependency of the Consulate."⁴⁶ However, Damianos, who had Arab support and remained dominant within the brotherhood, had no interest in accepting Athens's plan. The British, who had no reason to accept the control of an institution in Palestine by a foreign state, also supported Damianos.⁴⁷ For them, such a development would work as an argument for the French to maintain the capitulations regime. Further, it would provoke an Arab reaction during a period of social unrest resulting from the British support of the Zionist project. Not to mention that, rather than Athens, the British administration asserted its rule over the patriarchate via the creation of the Financial Commission, which took full control over its management.

After denying the Greek loan, it was clear to Athens that London would never accept its link to the patriarchate as having institutional justification. In short, Greece could not acquire the status of a protecting power in the place of Russia. From then on and until

the end of the Mandate, Greek policy focused on maintaining the Greek character of the patriarchate and interfering in its affairs in an unofficial way, without creating problems for domestic communal politics. This policy shift was determined by two factors. First, Athens could not exert any pressure over the Mandate authorities. Since the British were the sole administrators of Palestine, the only effective stance Athens could take to serve its objectives was to be moderate, avoiding any polarization that might promote the Arab Orthodox cause. Second, in geopolitical terms, Greece belonged to the zone of British influence. Athens could therefore not oppose the decisions of its patron, especially when London was Greece's primary, if not sole, ally in the Greek-Turkish war in Asia Minor (1919–1922).

Within this context, Athens's activity was, in practical terms, focused in two directions. The first was monitoring developments within the patriarchate, and intervening whenever Greek objectives were put into question. For instance, the Greek government unequivocally sided with the British against an Italian attempt to reopen discussions about the Status Quo in 1928, and did not dispute the Antiquities Ordinance (1929), which affected the operation of Christian shrines.⁴⁸ Greek diplomacy had an influential role in effectively handling local mobilization, endorsing the brotherhood in its efforts to maintain its privileged status vis-à-vis the congregation's demands, despite the fact that the British commission investigating internal affairs adopted a pro-Arab stance.⁴⁹ In the 1930s, the congregation put forward a claim for new patriarchal regulations that would upgrade its status within the church administration and increase its involvement in the financial management of the institution.⁵⁰ Athens did not intervene directly – a protective right that the British did not recognize as being vested to Greece – but it was in close contact with the religious officials throughout the affair.

The second direction toward which Athens put its energies was attempting to control the power game within the Greek clergy, laying the groundwork for the nomination of its preferred candidate to replace Damianos. To this end, Athens paid special attention to the return to Jerusalem of all of the Greek ecclesiastics exiled by Damianos in the aftermath of the events of 1917–1919. The Greek state declined to contribute financially to repair damages incurred to shrines during the 1927 earthquake until several clerics belonging to the opposition party were restored.⁵¹ After Damianos's death in 1931, Greek diplomats in London and Jerusalem galvanized in order to control the electoral procedure, attempting to block the involvement of the Arab congregation in the process.⁵² Athens supported the election of Meletios, but was actually ambivalent about whether his election would serve its interests.⁵³ It seemed that it was more important for the Greek Middle East diaspora for Meletios, at that time patriarch of Alexandria, to stay in his office, rather than move to Jerusalem.⁵⁴ The British favored Meletios as well, but abstained from interfering.⁵⁵ They believed Meletios, viewed by local Arabs as the representative of Greek ethnophyletism par excellence, would be a constant source of communal strife. Eventually, in 1935, Timotheos, the archbishop of Neapolis, having the support of Damianos's group and exploiting the tactical mistakes made by Meletios's network, was elected. Timotheos's election had to be ratified by the local authorities, however. This provided the British with an opportunity to obtain concessions from the new leadership with regard to Arab

demands.⁵⁶ As Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore stated, patriarchal confirmation presupposed acceptance of the reforms.⁵⁷ To put it cynically, the link between the confirmation and the enactment of new patriarchal regulations was “a sort of blackmail,” as senior Greek diplomat Charalampos Simopoulos described it.⁵⁸ Athens, for its part, demanded the immediate publication of Timotheos’s *berat* of investiture and focused on preventing the enactment of new regulations that would question the national character of the institution.⁵⁹ To this end, the Greek side emphasized two interconnected themes: the patriarchate is structured as a monastic brotherhood and thus the congregation could not co-administer its affairs; and this administrative structure was part of the Status Quo of the holy places and any alteration would be a violation of the Status Quo.

When the British reached an agreement with Greece regarding the content of the new patriarchal regulations, the outbreak of the Arab Revolt, which was vigorously supported by the Orthodox laity, stymied Timotheos’s appointment.⁶⁰ Moving ahead with his appointment would have jeopardized the authority of the communal leadership, whom the British anticipated would be a positive actor in negotiating an end to the revolt, or at least in influencing the congregation to withdraw its support for the national cause.⁶¹ The end of the revolt in 1939 opened the way for Timotheos’s appointment. British geopolitical considerations worked as an indirect factor, as well: On the eve of the Second World War, strengthening the alliance with Greece via symbolic gestures – such as not disputing the national character of the Jerusalem patriarchate – seemed more important than insisting on supporting the claims of the congregation, whose loyalty was questionable. As the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, G. W. Rendel pointed out that the adoption of a sympathetic attitude toward the Greek clergy was “in the interests of Anglo-Greek relations, which we wished to keep as smooth and friendly as possible.”⁶² The British did not alter this policy after the war, when the world was once more divided into zones of influence, those of the former allies and those of potential antagonists. Since London had forcefully placed its loyal political agents in Athens, controlling domestic elites and policy making, Greek rule within the patriarchate seemed a far better option than the Arab Palestinian alternative. It might have fatally damaged their interests “if yet another Greek Orthodox bastion against Russian influence is removed and transformed into a dependency of the Russian Church and Soviet State, as has happened in the past, and is now happening in the case of the Patriarchate of Antioch.”⁶³

Conclusion

Greek diplomacy viewed the regime change in Palestine after the First World War, in conjunction with the October Revolution, as an opportunity to establish itself as the protective power of Orthodoxy. However, after the termination of the capitulations regime, none of the great powers, and in particular Britain, would institutionally recognize such a status. Greece, as a state within the British zone of influence, did not have the power to react against the policy of its patron, whose support was a condition sine qua non for Greek success in the war against Turkey in Asia Minor. Taking into account British

assurances for the maintenance of the Status Quo in the holy places, Greece had to remain loyal and intervene in religious affairs only in unofficial ways, narrowing down its claims to the preservation of the patriarchate's allegedly national character and its demands for the deposition of Patriarch Damianos.

The early pro-Arab policy of the administration, the main expression of which was the Bertram-Young Commission support of the Arab Orthodox claims for changing the Greek character of the patriarchate, and the retention of Damianos indicate that, during the formative years of the Mandate, Athens failed to effectively implement its strategy. However, events during the 1930s related to the patriarchal election and the enactment of new regulations point to Greece's eventual success in effecting its agenda. Judging from the outcome, namely the ratification of Timotheos's election without making important concessions to the Arab congregation that might alter the national composition of the brotherhood (whose maintenance was the prime objective of the Greek diplomacy), the affair was handled effectively. Despite Greece having no direct influence on policy making, and its inability to impose its will, the fact that both the Greek character of the institution and the Status Quo remained unaltered indicate that the strategy of accommodating British needs was to a large extent productive for Greece's diplomatic goals.

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Endnotes

- 1 Within the Eastern Orthodox Church normative dictionary, the term autocephalous means the independent and sovereign church jurisdiction. To put otherwise, the Orthodox patriarch of Jerusalem incarnates the supreme authority over his institution.
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- 3 Steven Runciman, *The Great Church in Captivity: A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 176–77. See also: Hasan Colak, *The Orthodox Church in the Early Modern Middle East: Relations between the Ottoman Central Administration and the Patriarchates of Antioch, Jerusalem, and Alexandria* (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu, 2015).
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- 8 Rashid Khalidi, *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2007), 48–51.
- 9 Khalidi, *Iron Cage*, 48–64.
- 10 Néophytos Edelby, “L’autonomie législative des chrétiens en terre d’islam,” *Archives d’Histoire du Droit Oriental* 5 (1950–1951): 784–800; Antoine J. Fattal, *Le statut légal des non-musulmans en pays d’islam* (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1957), 85–119; Roberto Mazza, “Churches at War: The Impact of the First World War on the Christian Institutions of Jerusalem, 1914–20,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 45 (2009): 213.
- 11 On Italy’s role, see Sergio I. Minerbi, *L’Italia et la Palestine, 1914–1920* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970).
- 12 E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, *Documents on British Foreign Policy (1919–1939)*, First Series (London: H. M. Stationary Office, 1958), vol. 7, 103–111.
- 13 Pieraccini, *Gerusalemme*, 207; Woodward and Butler, *Documents*, vol. 13, 341.
- 14 Woodward and Butler, *Documents*, vol. 7, 162–171.
- 15 “Custody of the Holy Land, Les Lieux Saints de la Palestine: Mémoire des Latins à la Conférence de la Paix (1919),” in Collin, *Le problème juridique*, 173–77; Walter Zander, *Israel and the Holy Places of Christendom* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1971), 55–56.
- 16 Zander, “On the Settlement of Disputes,” 339–342.
- 17 Dimitris Stamatopoulos, *Metarrythmisi kai ekkosmikeusi: pros mia anasynthesi tis historias tou Oikoumenikou Patriarcheiou ton 19^o aiona* [Reformation and Secularization: Toward a Reformulation of the History of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in the 19th Century] (Athens: Alexandria, 2003); Derek Hopwood, *The Russian Presence in Syria and Palestine, 1843–1914: Church and Politics in the Near East* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Elie Kedourie, “Religion and Politics,” in *The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies* (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2004), 317–342; Abdul L. Tibawi, *Russian Cultural Penetration of Syria-Palestine in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Luzav and Co., 1966); Theophanes G. Stavrou, *Russian Interests in Palestine, 1882–1914: A Study of Religious and Educational Enterprise* (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1963); Elena Astafieva, “La Russie en Terre Sainte: le cas de la Société Impériale Orthodoxe de Palestine (1882–1917),” *Cristianesimo nella Storia* 24, no. 1 (2003): 41–68.
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