



Take My Camel: The Disappearing Camels of Jerusalem and Jaffa

Penny Johnson

Mandate-era postcard of Jaffa.
Source: Library of Congress.

“‘Take my camel, dear,’ said my Aunt Dot, as she climbed down from this animal on her return from High Mass,” is the once famous opening line of Rose Macaulay’s eccentric 1956 travel novel, *The Towers of Trebizond*.¹ And the first-person narrator does take the camel traveling from Trebizond (Trabzon) on the Black Sea all the way to Jerusalem, where she tethers the beast in the garden of Saint George’s church and hostel. This fictional *cameus dromedarius* is perhaps the last working camel – discounting a series of disconsolate camels offered for tourist photo ops on the Mount of Olives – to find his or her (sex never determined) way to the Holy City. Or is it? A few traces remain in Jerusalemites’ living memories. A distinguished historian, for example, was initially surprised by the subject of camels in Jerusalem but then remembered camels delivering heavy goods in the Old City during his boyhood in the 1960s.² A lawyer, in law school in Jerusalem in the 1940s,

at first emphatically says: “there were no camels in Jerusalem.” But then, he recalls camels in the Valley of the Cross, below where the Israel Museum now stands.³

I will later speculate on the reasons for what I term the repressed camel memory syndrome. However, it is clear that camels begin to vanish not only from urban and rural landscapes in late Mandate Palestine, but out of Palestinian memory as well. Looking through the lens of the early photographer of Palestine, Khalil Raad, and other photographic and textual traces of camels in the city, let us ask where have all the camels gone – and when and why.

Just a few of the images allow us to imagine camels in the urban and rural landscapes of Palestine, including Jerusalem, Jaffa, and the Galilee. A photograph in the American Colony collection shows a long camel train bringing grain from the Dead Sea to Jerusalem in 1917. A striking photograph of “Bedouins unloading wheat-laden camels” at Damascus Gate is dated in the range of 1920-1933. Raad’s own images feature a fair share of camels posed in biblical landscapes but also show them hard at work grinding grain in villages such as Issawiya near Jerusalem and delivering goods on a narrow street in Nazareth. Camels unloading goods at the Jaffa Port also feature in photographs and film through at least the middle years of the Mandate, as Eyal Sivan’s documentary, *Jaffa: The Orange’s Clockwork*, attests. Jaffa oranges and camels were inseparably linked as these strong animals carried the heavy crates to the port, perhaps up until its closure in 1936 – after that camels seem to have metamorphosed into advertising images for the oranges they once carried. Indeed, the transition of camels from working animals to advertising and tourist icons is a considerable part of the camel saga.

The Camel and the Wheel

Writing in the mid-1970s, historian Richard Bulliet, musing on the disappearance of the wheel in the Middle East in the Islamic period, made one of those sweeping generalizations that was permissible to academics of that felicitous time – the camel had replaced the wheel (the cart and chariots of the Roman and Byzantine era) and thus shaped the contours of Arab medieval and pre-modern cities, as well as their lack of paved city streets, as camels are notoriously tender-footed and prefer sand or dirt to paving stones.⁴ That camels trod the great cities of the region through the nineteenth century is attested by many travelers: Flaubert, sitting in a café in the old city of Cairo in 1850, for example, describes the panoply of sound around him, including “camel bells ringing in your ears.”⁵

In Mandate-era Palestine, are we simply seeing the inexorable replacement of the wheel for the camel or did other forces also contribute to, and quicken, the camel’s banishment to the desert? Did, for example, the twinned dynamics of British mandatory policies and Zionist economic enterprise contribute to the camel’s demise? To my dismay, scholars of Palestine have failed to address this burning question and seemingly have little interest in camels. Indeed, Bulliet himself may not have been too

attached to their presence – he once authored a murder mystery under a pen name with the ominous title *Kicked to Death by a Camel*.


I owe a description of this who-dunnit – perhaps the only one where the suspect is a camel – to Robert Irwin in his delightful and sadly unique essay on the camel,⁶ which ranges from anatomy to art, with tidbits on everything from camel breath (bad to very bad) to the animal’s love of music (good). But Irwin is also lured by the romance of the camel in the desert – whether in its practical, romantic or military role – and gives only passing attention to camels in urban settings and in rural agriculture. That the camel had some importance in the latter, at least in Ottoman Palestine, is attested by the Ottoman Land Tax in Palestine, which exempts “ploughing camels,”⁷ as well as another vanishing breed, buffalos (as long as they are ploughing). The *Survey of Western Palestine* (1882-1888) notes that the camel “is bred abundantly on the plains of Moab and in southern Judea,” and has been employed in Syria “from the earliest records,” but opines that the camel “is not suited for employment in the hilly and central districts of the country,”⁸ although we find some (protesting?) camels at work in these inhospitable venues during the Mandate.

The camel’s presence in urban settings, primarily as a pack animal (but sometimes for its meat, milk, or hide) is richly attested by early photography, although prevalence is hard to gauge. With the advent of the Mandate, however, British agricultural policy, British “camel orientalism,” and, importantly, British sequestering of Bedouin tribes, began to remove camels from coastal and central Palestine. But camels, we might say, went out with a bang.

In the Beginning: Camels and a Zionist-Palestinian Clash

An Israeli researcher, Yuval Ben Basset, reviewing petitions by Palestinians to the Ottoman Sultan in the Istanbul Archives, provides a fascinating revisionist account of one of the first clashes between Palestinian villagers and Zionist settlers in 1913 – with camels at the center of contention. As a staple of the Zionist narrative, the violent encounter between Jewish settlers from Rishon Letzion and villagers from neighboring Zarnuka featured Arab “thugs” from the village on “heavily-loaded camels” stealing grapes from settlement vineyards and beating up a Jewish guard, with the ensuing conflict leaving two Jews and one Arab dead. A petition by heads of families in the village to Sultan Mehmet V, translated by Ben Basset, tells a different story. The villagers complain that the Jewish settlers

wanted to strip the camel owners of their clothes, money and camels, but these men refused to give their camels and escaped from Lun Kara [Rishon Letzion] with their camels, protecting each other [to seek refuge with] men of the law . . . The above mentioned Jews attacked our villages, robbed and looted our property, killed and even damaged the family honor, all this in a manner we find hard to put into words.⁹



Camel carrying goods along Nazareth street. *Source: Khalil Raad, IPS collection.*

From a camel-centric perspective, we can take from this account a glimpse of camels as valuable working animals in coastal Palestine. But the fate of working camels became more complicated as the Mandate progressed, as we will examine below after a brief reflection on camels at war.

Camels in Conflict

The camel at war is perhaps most famously associated with the Arab Revolt and T.E. Lawrence – who once requested 2,000 camels from his British superior, along with weapons to fuel the revolt. Unlike many British travelers, Lawrence had a sympathetic affinity for camels: he criticized the British Imperial Camel Corps for overloading

their beasts,¹⁰ although in his excitement during the successful raid on the Ottoman garrison at Aqaba he shot his own camel in the head.¹¹ In Jerusalem itself, Jamal Pasha, supreme commander of the Fourth Ottoman Army, was “always protected by a camel-mounted squadron of guards,”¹² and one suspects camels featured prominently in his entrance into the city in November 1914, although his departure by train in 1917 was camel-less and thus lackluster. A more innovative use of camels in Jerusalem’s Old City came during an earlier conflict – the Crimean War – when Greek Orthodox monks herded camels into the residence of the newly-appointed Catholic patriarch,¹³ a less deadly, although perhaps more smelly, form of political-religious clash than we witness in the present.

Although the British Imperial Camel Corps – which fought in Gaza and Beersheba in October 1917 – was disbanded before the end of World War I, primarily to free troops for the Western front, it was not entirely the end of the militarized camel. One is tempted to include the Egyptian camel that threw Winston Churchill off as he attempted to force its pace during a ride to the Pyramids in 1921 at the conclusion of the Cairo conference, whose results were also forced by Churchill. But in Palestine too, the camel was mobilized for purposes of “public order.” An interim report of the British Civil Administration (1920-1921) addressed questions of public order and security, noting that a police force of 1300 had been established, but also:

In addition a new Gendarmerie of 500 men, 300 mounted, of whom 50 on camels, and 200 unmounted, is being organised. This force, while it will form a part of the Palestine Police, will not be employed on ordinary police duties. It will be highly trained under British Officers, will receive better pay than the ordinary police, and will be employed, in bodies of not less than twenty-five men, in the protection of the frontiers against raids from neighbouring territories and in suppressing any internal disturbances that may occur.

The image of mounted camels suppressing internal disturbances rings a contemporary bell, as we recall the pro-Mubarak assault on demonstrators in Tahrir Square on 2 February 2011 by camel and horse riders, but it is more likely that these camel-riding British gendarmes were directed against Bedouins, then present in numerous locations in Palestine, including the Galilee and the coastal plains, and whose movements across the new borders were viewed suspiciously. It is a pleasant ironic reversal that the last glimpse we have of camels at war was against the British. During the 1936-1939 Arab Revolt, rebels used camels to pull down parts of the Tegart security fence separating Palestine and Lebanon. The building of the fence, the brainchild of Charles Tegart (formerly of the Calcutta Police), who also built the series of military headquarters throughout Palestine called after him, was contracted to the Histadrut’s construction firm Soleh Boneh and was termed by *Time* magazine “Britain’s most ingenious solution for handling terrorism in Palestine.” However, as Khalili explains:

. . . although the security fence impeded movement for ordinary civilians and impeded access to farmlands, when it came to forestalling rebels, it proved useless. The Arabs dragged it apart with camels.”¹⁴

Camels in Circles: Roles in Peasant Agriculture

The more mundane story of working camels in Mandate-era Palestinian agriculture is difficult to piece together and was admittedly only a minor element in the major transformations taking place in land and labor in rural Palestine, of which the most striking was the increasing dispossession and landlessness of the fellahin by Zionist land purchases. Agriculture, however, remained at the center of the Palestinian economy throughout this period – employing (in the 1930 census) 53 percent of the settled population, overwhelmingly Arab at 93 percent. (And of course the settled population did not include Bedouins and their flocks of goats and camels.)

Generally, as El-Eini observes, animal husbandry was an important supplement to peasant livelihood and survival, with “sheep and goats . . . raised by Arabs for meat and milk. Mules, donkeys and camels were used as working animals and for transport.” El-Eini, whose work on Mandate agricultural and forestry policies has been quite helpful for this foray into the camel question, adds that two livestock censuses (in 1930 and 1937) “gave unsatisfactory results because animal owners suspected they were for tax purposes,”¹⁵ so sadly, accurate camel enumeration has escaped even the most assiduous of Mandate census officials. An American scholar of the time, E. Ray Casto, publishing in 1937, however, does use the census figures, while acknowledging their limitations, and the proportions of livestock are interesting: 72,000 camels, as opposed to a lesser 14,000 horses and 7,000 buffalos, and a much greater 160,000 cattle, 248,000 sheep, and 381,000 goats.¹⁶ He also makes the pertinent point that an “accurate census” of the flocks of nomads is “impossible,” so we may take it for granted that the number of camels (and the ubiquitous goat) is undercounted. Casto, who however has a keen eye (and perhaps orientalist-inflected glasses) for camels, gives them a central role in olive oil production, as well as a lesser role in the grinding of wheat, belying the wisdom that camels were absent from agriculture in Palestine’s hilly regions. While he bemoans the “primitive” methods of olive harvesting, he notes that the biblical “treading” by humans to extract oil has been replaced by the camel: “Today the stone [the millstone] is turned by an animal, usually a camel blindfolded so that it will not grow dizzy, harnessed to the stone by a long pole.”¹⁷ In the grinding of wheat, he notes that “the grain is trodden out by animals: usually oxen, but sometimes donkeys or camels, two to five abreast, are driven around in a circle.”¹⁸

I cannot claim great expertise in the complex agricultural and environmental transformations of the period, but, nonetheless, a brief review of existing literature from a camel-centric perspective suggests that British campaigns and legislation for the enclosure of Bedouins, against over-grazing, and for afforestation and “modern” agricultural practices, combined with Zionist visions and practices of

a new agriculture, including the promotion of the cow and its grassy needs for pasturage, were not, to say the least, camel-friendly, changing both their habitat and their location. British Mandate agricultural and forestry policy – and its quite uneven implementation – sought to redress what Mandate officials saw as a ravaged landscape and to replace it with an “imaginary landscape” that bore a striking resemblance to England’s green and pleasant land. The first Mandate head of the Department of Agriculture (which also included forestry), E.R. Sawyer, tellingly described Palestine using the words of a late nineteenth-century clergyman and traveler, George Adam Smith: “The land has been stripped and starved, its bones protrude . . . a carcass of a land.”¹⁹ While Palestine had indeed suffered the depredations of World War I where substantial numbers of trees were cut for fuel and construction, as well as the earlier arboreal destruction incurred during the invasions of Napoleon and Ibrahim Pasha (not to mention locust invasions), Palestine’s “forests” had little resemblance to any European vision of the same. This is not to say that the acute damage of war and neglect – such as soil erosion, particularly when terracing was not practiced and where the winter rains washed soil unimpeded down from the central hills – did not need to be addressed. But the mismatch of a visionary imperial landscape to the environmental and human realities of Palestine – including the emerging political conflicts – is a fascinating topic which the work of El-Eini and others has opened for exploration.

Grazing Camels: Public Enemy No. 2?

However, we must not forget the fate of our beast of burden amid these larger issues. A 1940s publication of the Soil Conservation Board declares the Palestine goat “Public Enemy No. 1,” reflecting Mandate forestry and agricultural officials’ pre-occupation with this admittedly omnivorous animal, which at one point they tried to replace with goats from Cyprus and Syria that seemingly were gentler grazers, as well as aiming to substitute cows and sheep for goats. However, this also reflects British officials’ general failure to accomplish much of real significance in campaigns against “over-grazing,” despite such drastic measures as the 1946 order to license all shepherds, who were then supposed to wear metal tags, and the even more draconian legislation for the enclosure of Bedouin tribes. Some of the failures are directly related to political conflict: the creation of an independent Department of Forestry with ambitious afforestation plans – including vigorous anti-goat campaigns – came in 1936, just as a number of the wooded areas in the central hills became rebel strongholds and thus off-limits for British tree-planting or other activity. Our dromedaries were perhaps a far-behind Public Enemy No. 2, but since Bedouin herds could include both camels and goats, the former may well have been caught in the anti-goat (and anti-Bedouin) crossfire. The “unsettled Bedouin” and their cross-border grazing practices were the subject of a number of acts of Mandate legislation which Falah in his study of the Galilee Bedouin of the Mount Tabor and Tiberias region argues were aimed at Bedouin sedentarization.²⁰ Falah includes in these initiatives forestry legislation as



Jaffa, camels carrying boxes of oranges to port. *Source: Library of Congress.*

well as acts specific to Bedouin tribes. El-Eini, who sees restricting the movement of Bedouins and their livestock as the key aim, notes that it took two decades to achieve this control. He quotes the Bedouin Control Ordinance No. 18 of 1942, which grants District Commissioners the power to:

Exercise general control and supervision over all or any nomadic tribes or tribesmen, superintend their movements and wherever he considers it necessary direct them to go, or not to go, or to remain in any special area for any specific period.

That the movement was generally south of Bir Saba and to the “hot and unclaimed areas of the Jordan Valley”²¹ surely is part of the explanation for the vanishing of camels from other Palestinian landscapes.

But there were also conflicts within Mandate offices as well as the larger conflict between the camel and the British-inspired forest, as El-Eini recounts:

The British could not get a handle on illegal grazing, and many conflicts arose between Sale [the head of the Department of Forestry] and the District staff over the issue. For example, large numbers of camels would be driven from around Beersheba to the Jericho-area in spring, “owing to the non-existence of pasture.” Sale once deprecated the Jerusalem District Commissioner’s suggestion that a reserve near Jericho be opened to grazing, instead proposing that grazing grounds be established in Beersheba. The Commission wrote that “an Arab will go a long way actually and metaphysically to save the life of his camel,” and warned against “a lack of sympathy.” But Sale held fast to the small 1,300 dunam Allenby State Closed Forest Area – the only one near Ramallah and Jerusalem in the Jordan Valley. “The attitudes of the forester towards his trees closely resembles that of the Arab towards his camel,” he retorted.²²

Given the constellation of forces, the forester seems to have won this battle – and the British forester’s habit of planting rapid-growth mono-cultural forests turned into standard practice in the new Israeli state, causing another set of environmental problems that could not be blamed on goats – or camels.

Jaffa, Oranges and Camels

As the 1913 incident at Zakurna attests, camels were present and familiar in coastal Palestine, whether in a village like Zakurna with settled Bedouins, or as a result of being purchased by peasants, or else brought to the coast seasonally by Bedouins or other camel-owners. Traveling from Ramle to Jaffa in the late nineteenth century, Mary Eliza Rogers and her entourage encounter “a little company of Bedouin Arabs”

feasting by the roadside on their way to Jaffa. She writes:

Some of them were mounted on the unwieldy looking animals, and their songs were already subdued to harmonize with their monotonous swinging pace, and chimed softly and plaintively with the tinkling camel bells—thus:

*Dear unto me as the sight of my eyes
Art thou, oh my camel . . .*²³

This romantic Orientalist vision can of course be deconstructed (although it is true that camels like to be sung to) but for our purposes it places camels in the coastal region, where, it seems, they remained through a good part of the Mandate. Whether or how these particular camels were put to work when they reached their destination remains unknown, but the migration of camel owners and their animals to the coast either for seasonal or permanent work seems reasonable. Indeed, the artist Hani Zurob's grandfather was one such migrant from his peasant clan in the southern Gaza Strip. At the beginning of the Mandate he bought a camel and struck out for a village near Ramle where he successfully "transported the village's fruit produce on his camel to the neighboring town markets."²⁴

But the most striking use of camels in coastal Palestine was hauling oranges from the orchards to the Jaffa port: an undated photo from that time shows camels leaving an orchard with their heavy loads and port scenes featuring camels are also plentiful, although also usually undated. Casto observes:

Railroads and auto trucks are found in Palestine. Although primitive and economically defective, the chief means of transportation is the camel caravan. Even in the rapidly developing orange industry, the camel plays an important role in carrying boxes of oranges to the market.²⁵

Casto also calls the orange industry "the dominating factor in the economic development of Palestine," and Eyal Sivan's film *Jaffa, The Orange's Clockwork*, captures its transformation from a mix of Arab and Jewish enterprises to a symbol of the new Israeli state. Sivan's plentiful use of documentary footage attests to the prominence of camels as pack animals during at least part of the Mandate years, but this rapidly growing industry also demanded other forms of transport. Growing up in the 1940s, Jaffa exile Hassan Hammami does not recall camels working as haulers of oranges but only "seeing camels on rare occasions, and not more than one, two or three, coming into town with some agricultural products, possibly dates from the south." While the scarcity of camels might partly be explained by the closure of the Jaffa Port during the years of World War II, Hammami, the son of an orange exporter, points out that "the amount of oranges grown and exported far exceeded the capacity of any large herd of camels," and notes the building of a bridge on King Faisal Street in Jaffa to "allow large trucks to go under Ajami without disrupting city traffic."²⁶

Hammami also remembers camel rides as a feature of holiday fairs in public spaces in the city during Eid al-Adha and Eid al-Fitr, suggesting that the tourist camel had its antecedents. Still, while it is possible that a few camels hauled oranges for smaller enterprises during this period, what is certain is that all that remained after 1948 was the camel as symbol of the Israeli Pardes company, one of the major exporters of “Jaffa oranges.”

Do camels emerge as an exotic or oriental symbol as they disappear from the Palestinian landscape? To some extent, the answer is yes, but in the mid to late years of the Mandate, they also were configured as a sign of the primitive side by side with an emerging and contrasting modernity. A popular Mandate-era postcard (which still turns up as a vintage postcard on E-bay) shows a camel with its Arab owner, traveling alongside a truck and a modern train. These echoes of both the primitive and the oriental are one possible explanation for the “repressed camel memory syndrome” among urban Palestinians. And these symbols are used in an illuminating way by Mandate officials and city planners in Jerusalem.

Jerusalem’s Camels

A striking photo from the Matson collection at the Library of Congress shows gaily-adorned camels at Damascus Gate, some kneeling, surrounded by their Bedouin owners. While not dated, we can assume such scenes continued to be seen at least through the early Mandate era, as attested by British architect Charles Ashbee’s 1920s unrealized plan for a khan at Damascus Gate to “provide overnight accommodation for the Bedouins and their camels for the purposes of trade.”²⁷ Pullan and Kryiacou call this function “atavistic” and rooted in Ashbee’s “orientalist vision of Jerusalem,” and perhaps they are right in the sense that a shift away from camels as primary haulers of heavy goods and produce was on the horizon, although they did not entirely vanish from urban Jerusalem.

In a conversation with a local Bethlehem historian and architectural conservationist, overlooking the aptly named Wadi al-Jamal (Valley of Camels) between Bethlehem and Beit Sahur, he noted that camel herds were stabled in the valley and used to transport produce to Jerusalem until about 1925, when motorized transport began to be used. Camels continued to be used by villagers, he believes, although their numbers in their eponymous valley decreased.²⁸

However, Jerusalem residents remember camels in the streets of the Old City and elsewhere, so probably the question of whether to use motor transport or a camel depended on economic resources, availability, and terrain. When a friend kindly assisted with inquiries about Jerusalem camel memories by emailing relatives now abroad, one respondent had a rather melancholy Mandate-era memory of a camel “blindfolded and hitched to a millstone, going round and round milling sesame seeds.” Issa Boullata, however, replied with a more cheerful and very vivid account:

Camels were seen in Jerusalem before 1948. I remember them very well as a boy growing up in the Old City of Jerusalem. They were used to carry heavy loads but were not as common as donkeys. As a boy, I remember a game with other boys: trying to pass to the other side of the road under the rope of a camel being led by its owner through the narrow streets of Jerusalem. One had to be nimble and quick to pass in front of the advancing camel, and not be trodden under. Sometimes there were two camels passing, led by a rope and one had to pass under the rope stretched between the two camels. Funny boyhood games and memories . . . ”²⁹

Camels were also not foreign to the rapidly growing Western neighborhoods of the New City. An undated but early Mandate-era photo captioned “View Down Jaffa Road” shows three heavily-laden camels alongside a horse-drawn carriage. An Armenian memoir describes how, in the Western suburbs, “Wood was brought around on camel back for heating.”³⁰ It is tempting to link the camels stabled in the Valley of the Cross, recalled by a lawyer in the 1940s, with these working camels.

And camels have a place, if contradictory at times, in the imaginations of Mandate officials and urban planners, as the example of Ashbee’s plan for a khan at Damascus Gate shows. But also in his writings for the Pro-Jerusalem Society “Ashbee routinely incorporated robed figures driving camels and donkeys, or carrying baskets,” in order to convey an oriental atmosphere.³¹ Late in the Mandate, a model prepared by Henry Kendall for Damascus Gate gives an almost eerie representation of the fate of the camel in Jerusalem: a sole camel and its owner stand by the side of a vast sanitized semi-circle with no other sign of human or animal life.

Jerusalem’s Last Camel

The last camel in Jerusalem, stationed at the Mount of Olives and available for tourist rides and photos with the Dome of the Rock in the background, met a very Palestinian fate in 2011 when he was detained by the Israeli police for not having the “proper paperwork.”³² Kojak, whose owner Ali Abu Hawa had originally been given a license by Jerusalem mayor Teddy Kollek, was jailed in Lifta while Abu Hawa, who found his requests to renew his license refused since 2009, sought to meet new bureaucratic conditions, including insurance coverage. An outcry from tourist guides – and insurance from a Tel Aviv company – eventually secured Kojak’s release. However, it was not a happy ending for Kojak as we discovered when we sought out Mr. Abu Hawa on the Mount of Olives.

On that clear sunny day in December 2012 a rather frisky-looking camel stood in the light breeze with Mr. Abu Hawa sitting beside him. But alas, although he was named Kojak, he was not the released prisoner, as Abu Hawa explained angrily. When the first Kojak was taken, a “racist doctor” said he needed a “shot” and Mr. Abu Hawa briskly answered: “*you* need a shot.” Kojak was detained for twenty days and

when Abu Hawa saw him, the camel emitted a loud and terrible groan – Abu Hawa attempted an imitation – and attacked his owner. Kojak had become *majnun* [crazed] during his incarceration. Although he was put out to pasture, the traumatized Kojak today prefers to sit in a dark place. The new Kojak is eight years old, so should have a long career ahead of him, as camels live for three to four decades, but Abu Hawa is not optimistic. “No animals in Jerusalem,” he says, summing up municipal policy.

Driving back to Ramallah from Jerusalem along the Wall separating Palestinian neighborhood from Palestinian neighborhood, I recall the role of camels in pulling down the Tegar wall in Mandate Palestine and imagine “primitive” camels riding again in the current fragmented and degraded urban landscape of Jerusalem, ready to pull down another Wall.

Penny Johnson is Associate Editor of the Jerusalem Quarterly. She is surprised to be writing about camels and hopes JQ readers will correct any errors and add more camel memories. She thanks Siham Atalla and Raja Shehadeh for their (somewhat bemused) assistance in research.

Endnotes

- 1 Republished as a New York Review of Books Classic with an introduction by Jan Morris in 2003, and more recently by the original New York publisher Farrar Straus Giroux in 2012.
- 2 Conversation with Dr. Nazmi Jubeh, Kalandia, 1 November 2012.
- 3 Conversation with Fuad Shehadeh, Ramallah, 13 October 2012.
- 4 See Richard Bulliet, *The Camel and the Wheel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
- 5 Gustave Flaubert, *Flaubert in Egypt* (London: Penguin, 1996), 79.
- 6 Robert Irwin, *Camel* (London: Reaktion Books, 2010).
- 7 Roza El-Eini, “Government fiscal policy in mandatory Palestine in the 1930s,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 33.3 (1997): 570.
- 8 H.B. Tristram, *Survey of Western Palestine (1882-1888): The Fauna and Flora of Palestine* (Cambridge: Archive Editions, originally published by the Committee of the Palestine Exploration Fund), 3-4.
- 9 Nir Hasson, “New documents reveal early Palestinian attitudes towards Zionist settlements,” *Ha’aretz*, November 4, 2012.
- 10 Irwin, *Camel*, 168.
- 11 James Barr, *A Line in the Sand: Britain, France and the Struggle that Shaped the Middle East* (London: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 46.
- 12 Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Jerusalem: an Autobiography* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson 2011), 395.
- 13 Montefiore, *Jerusalem*, 344.
- 14 Laleh Khalili, “The Location of Palestine in Global Counterinsurgencies,” *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 42 (2010): 422.
- 15 Roza El-Eini, “The Implementation of British Agricultural Policy in Palestine in the 1930s,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 32 (1996): 227.
- 16 E. Ray Casto, “The Economic Geography of Palestine,” *Economic Geography* 23 (1937): 250.
- 17 Casto, “Economic Geography,” 245.
- 18 Casto, “Economic Geography,” 240.
- 19 Roza El-Eini, “British Forestry Policy in Mandatory Palestine, 1929-1948: Aims and Realities,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 35 (1999): 77.
- 20 Ghazi Falah, *The Role of the British administration in the Sedentarization of Bedouin tribes in Northern Palestine* (Durham: University of Durham, Center for Middle East and Islamic Studies, 1983).
- 21 El-Eini, “British Forestry,” 118-119.
- 22 El-Eini, “British Forestry,” 118-119.

- 23 Mary Eliza Rogers, *Domestic Life in Palestine*, first published 1862, (London and New York: Kegan, Paul International, 1989), 66.
- 24 Kamal Boullata, *Between Exits: Paintings by Hani Zurob*, (London: Black Dog, 2012), 33.
- 25 Casto, "Economic Geography," 247.
- 26 Email from Hassan Hammami to author, 4 February 2013.
- 27 Wendy Pullan and Lefkos Kyriacou, "The Work of Charles Ashbee: Ideological Urban Visions and Everyday City Spaces," *Jerusalem Quarterly* 39 (2009): 58.
- 28 Conversation with Khalil Shawqi, Bethlehem, 25 January 2013.
- 29 Email from Issa Boullatta to Siham Atalla, 12 December 2013. Used with permission. The blindfolded camel was described in another email to Siham Atalla from a relative now 90 years old.
- 30 Rochelle Davis, "The Growth of the Western Communities," in *Jerusalem 1948: The Arab Neighborhoods and Their Fate in the War*, ed. Salim Tamari (Jerusalem: Institute of Jerusalem Studies, and Bethlehem: Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, 1999), 37.
- 31 Inbal Gitler, "'Marrying Modern Progress with Treasured Antiquity': Jerusalem City Plans during the British Mandate, 1917-1948," *Traditional Dwellings and Settlement Review* 15 (2003): 52-53.
- 32 Melanie Lidman, "Jerusalem bureaucratic hump sees Kojak the camel 'jailed,'" *Jerusalem Post*, May 1, 2011.