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The Hamas government prevented voter registration in Gaza, thus stopping elections from taking place there. At first, Palestinian Authority officials correctly decided to go forward with the elections in the West Bank, providing lengthy explanations for why they would not contradict reconciliation efforts. Many gave speeches lauding the role of local elections in building the state. However, it soon became clear that, though Hamas would boycott the election, Fatah would still face tough competition from unaligned, democratic parties. This was evident in all major cities, including Hebron, Ramallah, and Tulkarm.

Nevertheless, until the elections were canceled on June 10, it appeared that voting would go forward as scheduled. Voter registration took place, electoral lists were formed, observers were chosen—and then, a few minutes before the candidate registration lists were to be closed, the government in the West Bank announced that it was postponing the election until further notice.

So, while the government in Gaza prevented local elections, the government in the West Bank canceled them. This has caused great dismay among the people, who never believed the Palestinian Authority's argument that the election was canceled for the sake of intra-Palestinian reconciliation.

And, of course, it raises a fundamental question about the meaning of "state-building." Doesn't this term mean more than new construction projects, big government buildings, and a larger security apparatus?

Isn't the lesson from numerous failed states throughout the world that what matters most is the establishment of legitimate, representative democratic institutions? Surely this is a significant part of the reason why India and Brazil succeeded while Somalia, Afghanistan, and others have failed.

Our democratic shortcomings should not, however, be used by Israel as an excuse for the continued subjugation of the Palestinians in the occupied territories. This cruel Israeli practice is designed to provide an excuse for Israel's complicity in undermining our democracy, while whitewashing the greater crimes of its occupation.

Palestinians do not want a state in name only, with a flag and an anthem. We want

a sovereign nation—not clusters of Bantustans. And we want a democratic state where we can choose our leaders and our government. We do not want them appointed by foreign powers, who claim to act in our name. A real state requires that people live in freedom and prosperity, with dignity and full rights—and not with constant machinations from one party or another that subverts this process. Such maneuvering only squelches Palestinians' democratic rights and sets back the cause of peace.

ISRAEL

C1. IR AMIM, ANALYSIS OF THE JERUSALEM MASTER PLAN 2000, JERUSALEM, JUNE 2010.

In late June, it was reported that the Israeli Jerusalem municipality planned to submit for public review a master plan that would codify development plans for West and East Jerusalem as a single municipal unit for the next decades. The plan, the first in over 50 years, had been in the works for the past decade. It was reportedly ready for public review in summer 2009 but was frozen by Israeli interior minister Eli Yishai, for being too "generous" with regard to building possibilities offered to Palestinian residents. Israeli newspapers reports in early summer of the plan's imminent release failed to materialize, sparking speculation that it was once again on hold because of ongoing discussions between Israel, the United States, and the Palestinians about the prospects for a transition from proximity to direct peace talks, including a 6 July visit to Washington by Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

The following document by the Israeli organization Ir Amim outlines the main aspects of the master plan that relate to East Jerusalem, as well as the plan's feasibility and its political context. The report is available online at www.ir-amim.org.il.

On 5 May 2009, Jerusalem mayor Nir Barkat submitted his comments on the Jerusalem Master Plan 2000 to the District Planning and Building Committee, ahead of its deposit for public review. The purpose of the plan, according to the municipality statement, is "to guide and outline the city's development in the next decades." A team of planners, including 25 architects

and engineers, put together the plan during the terms of the previous mayors, Ehud Olmert and Uri Lupolianski. Once the master plan is deposited for public review, residents will have three months to submit their objections to it.

The last master plan for Jerusalem was deposited in 1959, and with the exception of neighborhood plans, this is the most comprehensive master plan for the city in the last 50 years. As far as East Jerusalem is concerned, it is the first time that a comprehensive master plan addresses the questions of building and development in the city's Palestinian neighborhoods. The absence of such plans in East Jerusalem during the last 43 years has created a complex and problematic urban situation, as reflected by the extensive construction without permits which, in turn, have led the municipality to demolish many houses in those areas.

Given the great importance of the master plan, which reflects the vision of the municipal and planning authorities in Israel for Jerusalem's future in the next decade, we wish to examine the main references to East Jerusalem in the master plan, the indicative trends, the extent of their feasibility, and their predicted municipal and political consequences.

Amount of Building and Demographic Goals

Jerusalem has more than 260,000 Palestinian residents living in 46,000 housing units, of which 20,000 were built without building permits. The master plan, which cites among its goals maintaining the demographic balance between the city's Jewish and Palestinian residents, provides an additional 13,550 new housing units for the Palestinian population of East Jerusalem, only 10,000 of which will be available for construction by 2030.

Initially, the plan's target date was 2020; but it seems as if postponing the target date by a decade did not take into consideration demographic projections: by the year 2030, Jerusalem's Palestinian population is expected to reach between 400,000 and 500,000, while its housing needs will be 70,000-90,000 housing units.

So that even if the city fully realizes the construction plans mentioned in the outline plan for East Jerusalem, there is already going to be a tremendous shortfall of 15,000-30,000 housing units by 2030. In other words, the Jerusalem municipality

and planning authorities are a priori shirking their responsibility for the housing needs of more than 150,000 Palestinian residents of the city in another 20 years.

In other words, the Jerusalem municipality is going to continue to offer tens of thousands of Palestinian residents the same three problematic options they have today: continued and unbearable crowding within existing buildings; migrating outside the city limits, which threatens Palestinians with a loss of their residency rights; and building without a permit, which places them under constant threat of demolition.

Mapping Future Construction

The master plan concentrates most of the housing units and development plans for East Jerusalem in the outlying northern and southern Palestinian neighborhoods: 2,000 housing units in Jabal Mukabir, 2,000 in Tel Adasa, and 2,500 in Bayt Hanina-Shu`fat. In what the Jerusalem Municipality refers to as "central East Jerusalem," it plans to build only 750 housing units.

There is reason to believe that not only urban-professional considerations guided the master plan's delineation of future Palestinian construction and development in East Jerusalem. In fact, the new master plan continues a consistent Israeli municipal (urban building plan 11555) and government (government decision 4090) policy of restricting Palestinian development in the boundaries of historic Jerusalem and routing it to the northern and southern Palestinian neighborhoods, while at the same time encouraging accelerated Israeli development of the area of the historic basin of the Old City. This trend has significant political implications that go beyond municipal issues. Restricting Palestinian construction in East Jerusalem to outlying neighborhoods and limiting it in historic Jerusalem are indicative of Israeli intentions for the future boundaries of the city: "excluding" (in the words of Ehud Olmert) the peripheral neighborhoods in the north and south from Israeli sovereignty, and deepening the Israeli presence in historic Jerusalem while squeezing the Palestinians out of the area.

The Feasibility of Realizing the Master Plan in East Jerusalem

Beyond the fundamental issues that the plan raises about East Jerusalem regarding

the extent and location of the planned construction, the very possibility of bringing the master plan to fruition is doubtful, due to a number of administrative obstacles. They include:

- In order to realize the building plans according to the new master plan, three conditions must be met:
 1. The existence of an adequate sewage infrastructure.
 2. The existence of an adequate road infrastructure.
 3. The existence of an adequate infrastructure of public buildings.

As a result of continuous neglect and the failure to invest resources, East Jerusalem's infrastructure is in very bad shape and far from meeting the necessary conditions for building according to the master plan. East Jerusalem suffers from a shortage of 70 [kilometers] of main sewage lines and mostly uses cesspools; the road infrastructure is decrepit and outdated (since 1967, not a single new road was paved in East Jerusalem for the Palestinian population); and the few public institutions that exist are inadequate for meeting the needs of the population (and it will suffice to mention the severe shortage of 1,500 classrooms as an example).

- The master plan stipulates that all new construction must present a permit from the Land Registry attesting to land ownership. This demand makes de facto construction in East Jerusalem almost impossible, because since the Ottoman period until now, registration of land ownership in East Jerusalem has not been systematic. In the past a letter from the village *mukhtar* was sufficient to confirm land ownership; in the absence of that possibility, a Palestinian resident wishing to realize the building options offered to him by the new master plan can expect to face an obstacle course with very low chances of success.
- Palestinian residents also require a permit from the municipality's legal advisor, confirming that no construction violations have been committed on the land in question. This requirement poses an almost insurmountable obstacle, as it involves a complex bureaucratic procedure

requiring manpower resources the city itself will be unlikely to marshal, and because, as aforementioned, the absence of an overall master plan for East Jerusalem has led to extensive construction without permits. This requirement actually punishes the Palestinian residents for the authorities' impotence.

The Master Plan in the Political Context

Like many other issues in Jerusalem, the issue of planning and construction in the city in particular goes beyond the municipal boundaries and has clear political significance and implications. The absence of an official and comprehensive master plan for East Jerusalem since its annexation in 1967 has had a severe effect on the building in and development of the Palestinian neighborhoods of Jerusalem. When examining the proposed master plan, however, we must remember that it is essentially a political plan drawn by Israeli authorities for an area whose residents are neither Israeli citizens nor do they recognize the legality and legitimacy of Israeli rule in the area.

A closer examination of the plan, from the declaration of its intention "to establish the status of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and the center of the Jewish people," to the deployment of the construction plans, attests to the plan's political agenda. The concentration of the prospective Palestinian construction in the peripheral neighborhoods in the northern and southern parts of East Jerusalem, the restriction of Palestinian construction in historic Jerusalem, and the almost insurmountable obstacles in realizing the plan in East Jerusalem all reinforce the hypothesis that the master plan is not driven by honest concern for the urban needs of one-third of the city's population, but rather by Israeli interests to control strategic areas while squeezing Palestinian residents out of them. The realization of this master plan will have far-reaching consequences for the feasibility of a political settlement over the future boundaries of Jerusalem accepted by both Israelis and Palestinians, because the plan seeks to sway the results of any future negotiations by establishing facts on the ground and by limiting the possibilities of territorial compromise to those outlying neighborhoods. Advancing

this plan as it is, while ignoring the points mentioned above, could exacerbate the already complicated situation in Jerusalem, aggravate the planning chaos and status of construction and public spaces, lead to the collapse of what little infrastructure does exist, and endanger the stability of the city and the region, in addition to drawing criticism from the international community, which is closely following every development in Jerusalem.

C2. ISRAELI SECURITY CABINET, DECISION ON EASING THE BLOCKADE AGAINST THE GAZA STRIP, JERUSALEM, 20 JUNE 2010.

Facing wide international condemnation for its 31 May interception of a six-vessel flotilla loaded with humanitarian supplies bound for Gaza during which nine activists were killed, and subjected to strong U.S. pressures to ease its blockade, Israel convened its security cabinet on 19 June to address the situation. On 20 June, after two days of heated debate, the cabinet passed a "decision on civilian policy towards the Gaza Strip" aimed at "providing relief" to Gaza's civilians while preventing the entry of materials that could be used by the " Hamas terror regime." Besides expanding the volume of goods allowed into the Strip, the decision simplified the control and supervision process. Instead of the previous blanket ban on imports into Gaza with exceptions appearing on changing and seemingly arbitrary lists for Israeli internal use only, the equation was now reversed: all goods were to be allowed into Gaza except those specified on published lists of prohibited items (see Doc. C3 below)—a solution publicly proposed by President Obama himself on 9 June. An "information booklet" on the decision and its implementation published in early July by the Israeli Defense Ministry's Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories detailed the increases in the volumes allowed in through Gaza's two remaining crossings for goods, Kerem Shalom and Qarni. While representing a marked improvement over the previous volumes allowed, the quantities were still only a fraction of what entered before the blockade was imposed in June 2006. The decision and the information booklet are available online at www.mfa.il.

Israel's policy is to protect its citizens against terror, rocket, and other attacks

from Gaza. In seeking to keep weapons and war material out of Gaza while liberalizing the system by which civilian goods enter Gaza, the government of Israel has decided to implement the following steps as quickly as possible:

1. Publish a list of items not permitted into Gaza that is limited to weapons and war materiel, including problematic dual-use items. All items not on this list will be permitted to enter Gaza.

2. Enable and expand the inflow of dual-use construction materials for approved [Palestinian Authority]—authorized projects (schools, health facilities, water, sanitation, etc.) that are under international supervision and for housing projects such as the UN housing development being completed at Khan Yunis. Israel intends to accelerate the approval of such projects in accordance with accepted mechanisms and procedures.

3. Expand operations at the existing operating land crossings, thereby enabling the processing of a significantly greater volume of goods through the crossings and the expansion of economic activity.

4. Add substantial capacity at the existing operating land crossings and, as more processing capacity becomes necessary and when security concerns are fully addressed, open additional land crossings.

5. Streamline the policy of permitting the entry and exit of people for humanitarian and medical reasons and that of employees of international aid organizations that are recognized by the government of Israel. As conditions improve, Israel will consider additional ways to facilitate the movement of people to and from Gaza.

6. Israel will continue to facilitate the expeditious inspection and delivery of goods bound for Gaza through the port of Ashdod. Israel welcomes cooperation and coordination with its international and regional partners in implementing this policy and will continue to discuss with them additional ways to advance this policy.

The current security regime for Gaza will be maintained. Israel reiterates that along with the U.S., EU, and others, it considers Hamas a terrorist organization. The international community must insist on a strict adherence to the Quartet principles regarding Hamas.

Hamas took over Gaza and turned it into a hostile territory from which Hamas prepares and carries out attacks against Israel and its citizens.